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Reforms, New Elites, and Old Structures
How to Win the Battle for a New Ukraine?
Iryna Solonenko
 
 
Summary  In the two years since its “Revolution of Dignity” – also known as  
Euromaidan – Ukraine has launched important reform initiatives. Most of them are 
still in the inception phase, however, and much remains to be done to ensure their 
sustainability. The past two years have made clear the enormity of the challenge 
Ukraine faces in its transformation. At the same time, it has also shown unprece-
dentedly strong determination on the part of new reform-minded actors to overhaul 
the old system. Ukraine today can best understood as a battlefield: the old system 
and its structures are fighting for their survival, as new actors – from both within 
the system and outside it – push for a new social contract. This struggle is taking 
place on an everyday basis at different levels, national and local, in a number of 
different reform areas. External actors can best contribute by giving stronger sup-
port to reformers while promoting development of institutions that limit the space 
for vested interests to persist. Special attention should be paid to enforcing and 
implementing already adopted decisions and new laws that change the rules of  
the game.
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Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity ended just over two 
years ago in the ouster of Ukraine’s then president Viktor 
Yanukovych.1 The protest movement’s promises and ex-
pectations were ambitious at the time, much as they were 
after the Orange Revolution 11 years ago. Ukrainians and 
the international community still remember the “reform 
fatigue” and political infighting that arrived shortly after 
the events of 2004–05. Voter disappointment, at least 
partially, was what enabled the backlash that culminated 
in Yanukovych’s authoritarian presidency (February 2010 
to February 2014).
In the past two years, Ukraine has managed to hold 
new elections for its key political institutions. Early 
presidential elections took place in May 2014, with Petro 
Poroshenko winning by a clear margin in the first round. 
Early parliamentary elections were then held in October 
2014, followed by the appointment in December 2014 of 
the new coalition government – the second government 
to be formed since Euromaidan. Local elections held a 
year later, in October 2015, offered a chance to elect new 
leaders at the local level. In mid April of this year the 
third post-Maidan government took power, ending two 
months of political stalemate.
It is natural to ask several practical questions at this 
juncture: Have the renewed political institutions brought 
any new political forces to lead the country? More impor-
tantly, have they improved the quality of policy making? 
Or do old structures and approaches still dominate? 
Where does Ukraine stand now on its path to democratic 
transformation?
In response to creeping “Ukraine fatigue,” this pa-
per argues the importance of two factors in particular. 
First, Ukraine’s controversial reform record thus far is 
deeply rooted in decades of partial, incomplete reforms 
undertaken since Ukraine achieved independence. This 
resulted in a system that serves a narrow circle of individ-
uals, leaving out society at large. This legacy has proved 
stubbornly resilient since Euromaidan. Therefore, many 
important reform initiatives have gone unnoticed – for 
they have not yet challenged the foundations of the old 
system. The second factor is that new, reform-minded 
actors have entered the system, supported by strong pres-
sure from vibrant civil society that, taken together, are 
making a big difference. Without carefully considering 
both of these dynamics, it is easy for observers to suc-
cumb to premature disillusionment. 
To understand the processes and trends developing in 
Ukraine today means recognizing the country as a battle-
field on which the old system and structures are fighting 
for survival against progressive new actors. The latter are 
struggling to overhaul the old system of governance, both 
within the system and outside it, and to establish a robust 
and viable social contract. This battle is taking place at 
different levels, national and local, in different reform 
areas and on a daily basis. The government and coalition 
crisis of February–April 2016 offered conspicuous proof of 
this struggle and the persistence of old legacies. The ap-
pointment this April of the new government is a positive 
achievement, since the dangerous scenario of early elec-
tions and continued instability has been avoided in the 
short term. More decisive reform efforts in dismantling 
the old system are needed, however, to hold the country 
on the right course.
Numerous Reform Efforts with Mixed 
Results
The current developments are of course best understood 
in the context of Ukraine’s overall trajectory. This paper 
examines reform efforts in terms of how they contribute 
to shaping what we might call the “new Ukraine.” While it 
is not always useful to look at Ukraine through the prism 
of Western academic paradigms, some reference to the 
bigger picture can help put things into perspective. A the-
oretical framework might be helpful that conceptualizes 
countries as “limited access societies” (or natural states) 
or “open access societies” and explains the transforma-
tion from the first social order (typical for the majority of 
countries) to the other (typical for developed democratic 
countries).2 If one looks at what the Euromaidan aspired 
to and the goals of the documents that supposedly guide 
Ukraine’s reform process, one can conclude that the ulti-
mate goal is to transform the country from a “closed ac-
cess” social order to an “open access” one – that is, from a 
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system of governance where the powerful engage in rent-
seeking behavior and restrict competition to a system 
governed by impersonal norms and competition, one that 
therefore provides a wide spectrum of individuals and 
organizations with democratic participation and access to 
resources.3 This desirable system is exactly the new social 
contract that the Euromaidan protests demanded and 
that the progressive forces in Ukraine are fighting for.
Without underestimating the efforts of the Ukrainian 
authorities to stabilize the macroeconomic situation and 
to initiate numerous reforms in many areas (assessment 
of which can be found elsewhere 4), this article examines 
in particular four areas where changes are essential for 
the above-mentioned transformation: promoting political 
accountability, breaking monopolies on public resources, 
furthering the rule of law (including fighting corruption), 
and strengthening implementation capacity (in essence, 
reforming the civil service). This overview shows two 
things: First, important changes that have the potential to 
undermine the very pillars of the old system have taken 
root. Second, most of them have so far taken the shape of 
adopted laws or newly established institutions but have 
hardly been implemented – either because changes objec-
tively take time or because there has been resistance and 
lack of capacity. This means that the changes have yet to 
reach critical mass and as such are still quite fragile.
Promoting Political Accountability
Accountability starts with access to information and 
transparency. In this respect a lot has been achieved. The 
public finance system has become more transparent. The 
official web portal E-Data was launched in September 
2015 to deliver information on public spending.5 The proj-
ect offers free online tracing of public spending at nation-
al and local levels. As of 2016 it also includes information 
on the use of public funds by state-owned and municipal 
enterprises. The data is updated every day and comprises 
approximately one million transactions daily.
Since February 2015, it has been possible to follow on-
line a portion of the public procurement operations. This 
makes the bidding process and selection of tender win-
ners more transparent and competitive, which, according 
to experts, has already reduced the degree of corruption 
in transactions from 30 percent to 10–12 percent. As of 
2016, this online system, called ProZorro, began covering 
all public procurement operations in Ukraine.6 Experts 
claim this will help save Ukraine’s state budget about 50 
billion hryvnia (about 1.7 billion euros) in 2016.7
Property and asset registers have become open, mak-
ing it possible to search not only by the property but also 
by the name of the owner. Moreover, a separate law on 
ultimate beneficiaries of companies was adopted. The lat-
ter step reduces the risk of corruption, as it obliges com-
panies to disclose information about ownership structure, 
founders, and ultimate beneficiaries, who may maintain 
their legal address outside of the country.
Access to public information in general has increased. 
The procedure for requesting and receiving information 
has become more user-friendly, and the spectrum of in-
formation that is subject to disclosure has broadened. 
This is an impressive list. Yet these initiatives only 
offer tools. To use those tools requires willingness and 
competence on the part of public authorities; competent 
bureaucracy is needed on the one hand, while capacity 
and initiative of the people is needed on the other. Trans-
parency as such does not automatically translate into 
accountability. By the same token, better access to the au-
thorities does not guarantee having an impact on decision 
making. Civil society activists in Kiev and in the regions 
confirm that there is lack of capacity in many cases at the 
grass-roots level to use these tools.8 While authorities in 
Kiev have become more open and while civil society in 
Kiev has proved very capable, this has not always been 
the case at the regional and local levels.9 
Breaking Monopolies
A number of initiatives have been launched to break the 
monopolies on public resources, be they economic, politi-
cal, or informational. Since Ukraine has functioned as 
a “captured state” – meaning that only a limited group of 
actors has controlled nearly all public resources – releas-
ing these resources should be a vital task.10 
To this end, public broadcasting was introduced 
with an independent supervisory/editorial board. (The 
board includes eight representatives appointed by the 
authorities and nine representatives from civil society.) 
Importantly, this reduces the monopoly of commercial 
and political interests in public discourse, since it offers 
impartial and potentially higher quality media products. 
In a situation where most influential television channels 
are owned by oligarchs, who often use the media to fur-
ther a certain political agenda, public television can make 
a difference.
Additionally, a law on transparency in media owner-
ship was passed. Coupled with the law on state funding to 
political parties, which will decrease party dependency 
on funding by oligarchs, it will create a more competitive 
environment for young political forces.
Initiatives aimed at ending monopolies in some sectors 
of the economy and revising or eliminating state subsidies 
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to businesses have also been launched. Reform of the 
natural gas market is well underway; the introduction 
of market prices has already helped to diminish sources 
of money flowing into private pockets instead of into the 
state budget. There have also been attempts to reform 
the system of state enterprises. At the moment there are 
3300 state enterprises. They are jointly responsible for a 
loss of five billion dollars annually.11 Many of them are 
poorly managed and provide enormous opportunities for 
corruption. In some of these enterprises, management 
has been replaced, but there is strong resistance to this 
process, backed by influential lobbies. In the longer run, 
the plan is to privatize the majority of these enterprises, 
while bringing the most important ones together into a 
state-owned consortium. 
A number of decisions on deregulating the economy 
were taken. Ukraine moved up four positions in the World 
Bank Doing Business ranking for 2016, mainly to reflect 
substantial reduction in the time required for starting a 
business. By the end of 2015, the number of permission 
documents for starting a business was reduced from 143 
to 84.12 These changes will contribute to establishing 
free and equal market access and to the development of 
entrepreneurship.
Despite these measures, genuine removal of monopo-
lies has not yet occurred; only initial steps have been 
taken and still need to be implemented.
Fostering Rule of Law
Promoting the rule of law is an essential area of trans-
formation, and reforming Ukraine’s judiciary is key to 
achieving this end. Fair, impartial, and efficient enforce-
ment of law and norms is what creates a system based on 
the rule of law and serves as a safeguard against arbitrary 
rule.
Progress in this area has moved more slowly than 
expected. Probably the most visible success was the 
launch of the new police force, which came into existence 
in November 2015. Inhabitants of Kiev, Odessa, L’viv, and 
other cities could already sense the change as new police 
cars with new trained officers appeared on the streets. 
The presence of police became more visible than before, 
yet in a very positive way, since the attitude of the new 
personnel is service-oriented. Bribes, which were previ-
ously omnipresent, are now impossible.
The reform of the judiciary and the prosecution, how-
ever, has not yet succeeded. A piece of good news is that 
amendments to the constitution concerning the judiciary 
(which also include substantial reduction of the role of 
prosecution) have finally been agreed to by all stakehold-
ers and are expected to be voted in the first reading soon. 
In the best-case scenario, the reform will come into force 
in autumn 2016 and will pave the way for the overhaul of 
the entire judiciary – both the system and the judges.13
Fighting corruption is an indispensable aspect of 
fostering the rule of law. New important institutions have 
been established to take on this issue, most notably the 
Anti-Corruption Bureau, which is supposed to fight cor-
ruption at the highest levels. When achieved, its goal of 
bringing corrupt high-level officials to justice will provide 
a key signal to society that things have changed. The law 
enabling the bureau’s work ensures its independence 
from political influences and that the selection proce-
dure of its staff and the bureau’s work are supervised by 
independent experts from civil society. After some initial 
tension, the anti-corruption prosecutor was appointed 
and the institution began operating. By February 2016 the 
bureau had launched 56 criminal investigations, some of 
them against MPs and judges.14 Yet, according to experts, 
it needs more staff to accelerate its work. Moreover, col-
lecting evidence is often complicated.
At the same time, there was strong resistance to set-
ting up a National Agency for Preventing Corruption and 
launching efficient electronic declaration of assets, and 
the Agency started its work only in March 2016, much 
later than expected. Both of these reforms were condi-
tions for establishing visa-free travel to the EU. 
In practice, corruption continues to persist in a number 
of critical areas. The Ukrainian state budget has been 
losing 500 billion hryvnia (roughly 17 billion euros) a 
year merely through the inefficient work of its customs 
services.15 The Ministry of Health has been a substantial 
source of corruption, costing the state budget billions of 
hryvnia while depriving patients of access to medicine.16 
Although many corruption scandals have not yet been 
followed up, there have already been some notable ex-
ceptions. Ihor Mosiychuk of Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, 
and Henadiy Korban of the UKROP party were detained 
last year in two prominent cases. Others, such as the 
MP Mykola Martynenko (a close alley of former Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk) and the Prosecutor General, 
Viktor Shokin (a personal friend of President Porosh-
enko) had to give up their respective posts after tremen-
dous pressure was exerted, including from the West. Yet 
many other individuals from the former Party of Regions 
or allies of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk who featured in 
corruption investigations, continue to exercise political 
influence.
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Reforming the Civil Service
This is an important area that ensures successful imple-
mentation and sustainability of legislative initiatives. 
Basically, it is about the state’s capacity to implement 
decisions and turn them into functional rules. So far 
there has been too much resistance for positive change to 
take root in this area. The new law on civil service passed 
in December 2015 and coming into force as of May 2016 
offers the opportunity to launch a new system of civil ser-
vice with new, quality personnel. It largely incorporates 
the demands of civil society and international donors, 
although it does not yet tackle the problem of low salaries. 
The newly appointed vice prime minister for European in-
tegration, Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze, announced that 
this will be one of her priorities. In June an action plan of 
transformation for this area is supposed to be adopted.
In the above-mentioned areas that are essential for 
Ukraine to adopt a new social contract, changes have 
been initiated to take matters in the right direction, but 
they have hardly been implemented as yet to make a 
real difference. Ukraine is still locked in the old system, 
although it has been shaken.
The Extent of the Challenge: Old Legacies as 
a Source of Resistance
To understand why change has been so uneven, it is im-
portant to understand the extent of the challenge and the 
degree of resistance that Ukraine’s reform-minded actors 
are currently facing. 
Post-Euromaidan Ukraine inherited difficult legacies, 
ranging from Yanukovych’s four-year rule to previous 
governments going all the way back to the early 1990s. No 
serious change ever took place. Rather, cosmetic changes 
and partial reforms created a system of “state capture” 
by a small circle of political and economic actors, which 
offered society at large only limited access – or no access 
at all – to decision making and public resources. Twenty-
five years of halting reform left behind dysfunctional 
institutions, so the latter in many cases have to be built 
from scratch. Moreover, underdeveloped political culture 
makes it complicated for the branches of power to reach 
consensus and for the entry on the scene of genuine politi-
cal parties that would replace top-down and short-lived 
political projects.
It is important to bear these factors in mind when 
assessing the pace and success of genuine reform. More 
time and effort will be needed for it to succeed, as radical 
change is not possible overnight.
“State Capture” by Vested Interests
In Ukraine’s 25 years of independence, a system evolved 
whereby a handful of rich men gained unique access to 
public resources, including influence on decision mak-
ing by public institutions. The latter has consolidated the 
privileged position of these individuals compared to the 
majority of society. These individuals have come to own 
the most popular and influential TV channels and con-
tinue to finance political parties. This has allowed them 
to have their interests represented in public institutions, 
including courts, and to preserve monopolies over entire 
sectors of the economy, while engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior – that is, extracting profit from public resources. 
Even now, two years after Euromaidan, the assets of the 
one hundred richest Ukrainians equal approximately one 
fourth of Ukraine’s GDP, and 60 percent of these assets 
belong to only ten individuals. This is the case despite the 
fact that between 2013 and 2015, the one hundred richest 
Ukrainians together lost half of their wealth.17
This explains why any attempts to undermine this 
system and establish new rules of the game have faced so 
much resistance. The most prominent example was the 
conflict around the semi-state energy company Ukrnafta, 
where Ihor Kolomoisky, the third richest Ukrainian, owns 
42 percent of the shares. For years he blocked the state 
from accessing its dividends, since a 60-percent quorum 
for shareholder meetings was needed to enable this. (The 
state owns a stake of 50 percent plus one share.) The law 
that changed this situation was passed with many dif-
ficulties, while the replacement of the company’s man-
agement, previously controlled by Kolomoisky, resulted 
in a direct confrontation with law enforcement. Because 
of this conflict, Kolomoisky had to resign as governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk region, a position he held between March 
2014 and March 2015. 
A fresh example of how informal arrangements over-
ride formal institutions was the parliament’s failure on 
February 16 to pass a no-confidence vote for the govern-
ment, although immediately prior to this, a majority of 
MPs voted to express a negative opinion of the govern-
ment’s performance. The fact that several influential MPs 
– from Petro Poroshenko Block, the majority of the Opposi-
tional Block, and two independent groups, Vidrodzhennia 
(Renaissance) and Volya Narodu (People’s Will) – did not 
support the no-confidence vote gave some reformers and 
journalists grounds for claiming that the outcome of the 
vote had been agreed to in advance by Poroshenko and 
Yatsenyuk in tandem with the oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov, 
Ihor Kolomoisky, and Serhiy Liovochkin.18
6 Reforms, New Elites, and Old Structures – How to Win the Battle for a New Ukraine?
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 4 / May 2016
Weak Democratic Institutions
Ukraine also inherited unstable democratic institutions. 
The constitution has been changed back and forth several 
times. After both the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, 
constitutional provisions were introduced to allow for 
more power sharing between the president and the 
parliament, while stronger presidential rule was largely 
restored in 2010. Although Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk 
managed to avoid the sort of crippling political infight-
ing that was seen after the Orange Revolution, the fact 
that tension is still enshrined in the constitution hardly 
guarantees efficient cooperation between the branches of 
power. 
Election legislation has changed every time before new 
elections. Ukraine has experienced a purely majoritar-
ian system, a mixture of majoritarian and proportional 
systems, a proportional system, and a return to the 
hybrid one again in 2012. The new law on local elections 
came into force less than a month before the elections 
of October 25, 2015 – against internationally recognized 
standards. The system continues to undergo changes.
The old, dysfunctional system has been deeply en-
shrined in the law-enforcement authorities, the judiciary, 
and the civil service in particular. It was particularly 
evident during the Maidan demonstrations, when both 
the judiciary and the police were used as repressive bod-
ies against the protesters. As Kyiv Post rightly pointed 
out, Ukraine has 18,000 prosecutors, 10,000 judges, and 
150,000 police officers and investigators, and “none of 
them can deliver justice or rule of law.”19 This is coupled 
with an oversized and dysfunctional civil service, and 
many reforms are blocked or delayed at this level.
Underdeveloped Political Culture
 Poor political culture manifests itself in many ways. One 
of them is poor coordination of efforts among public in-
stitutions and different branches of political power. Thus, 
since the parliament started work in December 2014, it 
has passed only 36 percent of bills prepared by the gov-
ernment.20 Among the various reasons given by MPs and 
government representatives are that the volume of bills is 
too large (approximately forty laws a day are considered 
and passed); that expertise behind the bills is lacking; 
and that vested interests penetrate the bills at different 
stages.21
Moreover, the government has not acted as a coherent 
team. Instead, individual ministers have been pushing for 
some reforms within their own spheres of competence. 
There is a limit to such a mode of policy making, especial-
ly when the cabinet has to deal with conflicting objectives 
(for instance, the collision between securing more budget 
revenue and creating a more favorable taxation environ-
ment for small and medium-sized enterprises).
The lack of ideals and values around which certain 
political actors could unite is another manifestation of the 
deficiencies in political culture. There are almost no polit-
ical parties in Ukraine that have an ideology and program 
representing certain societal interests. Their regional and 
local membership base is also weak. Instead, Ukrainian 
political parties are mere political projects, organized in 
a top-down way and often centered around one leader. 
Moreover, parties that succeed in entering parliament are 
mostly backed by oligarchs, both financially and through 
media resources. Of the six political parties that entered 
parliament in the October 2014 elections, only Fatherland 
(led by Yulia Tymoshenko) had existed as a party before. 
Most others were created in 2014 after Euromaidan.22 
Local elections held in October 2014 showed the strong 
role of oligarchs behind political parties. While Rinat 
Akhmetov succeeded in Zaporizhia and Donetsk regions, 
Ihor Kolomoisky did the same in Kharkiv. Both oligarchs 
competed with each other in Dnipropetrovsk region and 
came to share influence there following the elections.23
An additional challenge that complicates the situation 
has to do with the strong disillusionment of society and 
the related growth of populism. Public opinion polls show 
that by the end of 2015, 60 percent of citizens felt things 
were moving in the wrong direction.24 One of the reasons 
has to do with the fact that authorities have focused on 
macroeconomic measures. Indeed, Ukraine has been 
able to avoid a financial default, managed to stabilize its 
financial system, and has already showed some growth in 
2016. But people hardly feel the impact of these measures. 
Moreover, although citizens consider the “fight against 
corruption and corrupt individuals” to be the second big-
gest priority the authorities should focus on (after secur-
ing peace in Donbas), not much has been achieved in this 
direction.25 This feeds disappointment.
Is It Different This Time? New Trends that 
Give Hope
While the old legacies that resist reform have been 
around for years, the emergence of progressive enclaves 
within the system and strong social capital and pres-
sure from civil society are the features that make post-
Euromaidan Ukraine different from the situation that 
prevailed after the Orange Revolution. The opening up 
of opportunities for new reformers to enter the system 
and to exert some leverage is a game changer. Not only 
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can they promote and implement new legal norms and 
practices, they also make the old system’s deficiencies 
more visible and help channel pressure from civil society. 
Strong social capital reflected in active civil society and 
volunteer activities is also a new phenomenon and an im-
portant prerequisite for the development of a new social 
contract in Ukraine.
Enclaves of Reform within the System 
Both President Poroshenko and former Prime Minister 
Yatsenyuk, although not considered reformers themselves, 
allowed progressive actors to enter the parliament and 
take positions in public authorities. Thus, despite an over-
all lack of political will, important enclaves of reformers 
have emerged in the public authorities, both at the central 
and local levels. They promote certain modifications and 
change practices in their areas of competence. According 
to different estimates, there are currently some fifty re-
formist MPs in Ukrainian parliament. Since they entered 
parliament on different party lists, many of them joined 
the cross-party group Euro-optimists and are seeking to 
promote initiatives that represent new values and a new 
type of political behavior.26 Recently, reformist MPs from 
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc protested alleged corruption in 
their faction and among MPs in general and announced 
an initiative to fight this.27
According to different sources, new reformers in the 
government include around 200 people. (The civil service 
consists of about 300,000 people in all.) Some used to be 
foreign nationals who have accepted Ukrainian citizen-
ship. Others were recruited through the Professional Gov-
ernment Initiative, an initiative created by Ukrainians 
with degrees from Western universities.28 They mostly 
took the posts of ministers, deputy ministers, and heads 
of departments, with varying degree of success. Vox 
Ukraine rated the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the Na-
tional Bank of Ukraine, and the respective ministries of 
Finance, Justice, Social Policy, and Agriculture as the best 
performers in the previous government.29 There are re-
form-friendly enclaves at the local level as well. In Odessa 
region, Mikheil Saakashvili – despite the controversy 
surrounding the former Georgian president and current 
Odessa regional governor – replaced all heads of district 
administrations with new reform-minded professionals 
with management backgrounds and educational degrees 
from abroad, selected through open competition.30
Young political parties are slowly making their way 
into big politics. One example is the party People’s Power 
(Syla Liudei), which received 230 seats in 62 local coun-
cils or mayoral positions in twenty regions of Ukraine. 
This party had only 200 members in 2014. By the 2015 
local elections, membership had increased to almost 
3,000.31 The party is transparent in reporting all sources 
of financial support, and the statute prohibits individual 
donations exceeding 40,000 hryvnia (or about 1400 eu-
ros), making it impossible for the party to accept support 
from oligarchs. In some cities and towns in Ukraine, even 
candidates that had no administrative resources or strong 
financial backing were elected as mayors or showed good 
results. Such cases include Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine, 
where the representative of the Self-Reliance party beat 
the Opposition Bloc representative, and Glukhiv, a town 
in Sumy region where a French businessman with Ukrai-
nian roots won despite many obstacles presented by local 
authorities and law-enforcement.
New police and the above-mentioned Anti-Corruption 
Bureau are examples of new structures that represent a 
new system. In both cases employees were hired through 
rigorous selection procedures, and they are well paid; 
there are also safeguards to ensure the integrity and pro-
fessionalism of their work. 
Strong Social Capital and Pressure from Below
Two important outcomes of Ukraine’s Revolution of 
Dignity are society’s higher expectations and strong 
pressure from civil society. Euromaidan made it possible 
to fill major political posts through fresh elections: the 
presidency, the parliament, the government, and recently, 
local authorities as well. Large numbers of Ukrainians 
took to the streets and some lost their lives for the chance 
to transform the country. Many more lives have been lost 
in the military conflict with Russia, and Ukraine’s borders 
have been altered. This is too high a price, and it needs 
to be justified; it puts the political elite under pressure in 
ways it has not experienced before.
Numerous advocacy and watchdog initiatives with 
strong expertise pressure the authorities on a daily basis. 
A notable example is the platform Reanimation Package 
of Reforms (RPR), which emerged right after Euromaidan 
and brought together over thirty civil society organi-
zations from all over Ukraine who have accumulated 
substantial expertise in various areas of reform over the 
years. It is mostly due to the expertise and pressure of 
civil society that the above-mentioned changes were initi-
ated. According to RPR, since the end of Euromaidan, 75 
initiatives with RPR involvement were passed as laws.32
Another important trend is the boom in investiga-
tive journalism and media coverage of corruption cases. 
Numerous Internet resources exposing corruption at the 
highest level were launched and have gained a broad 
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audience. Television programs have also played a role 
here (which was not the case before). The Anti-Corrup-
tion Bureau has launched several investigations based on 
media reports.
Another sign of stronger social capital in post-Euro-
maidan Ukraine is widespread voluntarism. According 
to an opinion poll conducted in September 2014, 77.7 
percent of Ukrainians provided support to the army and 
to internally displaced persons between May and Septem-
ber of that year.33 This trend continued, and it is therefore 
not surprising that volunteer initiatives topped opinion 
polls on the level of trust in public and civic institutions in 
Ukraine: in December 2015, 68 percent trusted volunteer 
initiatives more than other institutions.34
One of the new important trends in Ukraine is the 
appearance of small entrepreneurs producing a diversity 
of goods that in previous years were imported. “Made in 
Ukraine” rapidly became a sought-after brand, mainly 
among middle-class Ukrainians in the big cities. Elec-
tronic petitions, which citizens can now file online and 
present to national and local authorities (provided they 
bear the required number of signatures) have become 
quite popular. This shows that there is a share of society 
ready to take things into its hands without merely waiting 
for change to come from above.
Conclusions and Recommendations
For many observers of Ukraine, the enthusiasm con-
nected to Euromaidan was quickly followed by disap-
pointment. Various factors contributed to disillusionment: 
the war, the country’s catastrophic economic situation, 
the strong presence of the Russian narrative of develop-
ments in Ukraine transmitted by Western media (of civil 
war, of Ukraine as a failed state), the continued visibility 
of oligarchs and corruption, and the lack of political will. 
This, in turn, soon turned to fatigue and apathy. The lat-
est political crisis – the break-down of the coalition and 
the two-month stalemate, which was finally resolved with 
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk’s resignation in April 2016 and 
the appointment of the new government – once again ex-
posed the persistence of vested interests, further under-
mining faith in the idea that Ukraine might succeed.
Another problem has to do with too strong a focus 
on the Minsk Process. The situation around Donbas is 
seen by many Western decision makers as a burden that 
needs to be removed as soon as possible – a precondition 
for, among other things, paving the way for returning to 
“business as usual” with Russia (that is, lifting sanctions). 
Since it is difficult to make Russia comply with the provi-
sions outlined in the Minsk Process, too much pressure is 
put on Ukraine to conduct local elections in Donbas with-
out considering the long-term implications such a step 
might have for the country. (Here we assume that elec-
tions there cannot be free and fair and that they would 
only legalize the current criminal regimes in Donbas and 
their leverage on developments in Ukraine.)
Against this background, many important albeit less 
visible developments in Ukraine go unnoticed. While 
many of these developments do give grounds for pessi-
mism, observers fail to comprehend that those develop-
ments are in fact the natural result of almost 25 years of 
partial reforms – or even pseudo-reforms. If anything, 
they emphasize the degree of challenge Ukraine is facing. 
A key point to understand is that there is a constant 
struggle between the new actors who want change and 
old structures and actors who protect the status quo. The 
struggle is taking place at different levels and in differ-
ent areas, with uneven progress in each of them. The 
outcome of the struggle remains unclear. While many 
expected changes have yet to occur, achievements out-
lined earlier in the paper deserve attention as well. Those 
successes can be attributed to the new actors, who bring 
a heretofore unseen degree of enthusiasm, skill, and com-
mitment.
It is also important to understand that, in the countries 
where it succeeded, the process of changing the social 
contract took decades. Ukraine, too, needs time, and its 
success will be an important contribution to the project of 
European integration.
Recommendations
What can Germany and the West do to support posi-
tive change in Ukraine today? In the current context of 
struggle, the role of external actors can help bring about 
a tipping point in favor of reform. Within public discourse, 
open support for progressive initiatives in Ukraine by 
Western politicians and Western diplomats can make a 
difference, and there are many successful examples of 
this. (It is, moreover, a relevant thing to do, since in many 
cases the West already supports those reforms finan-
cially.) It was thanks to several public statements and 
letters to Ukrainian authorities from the EU Ambassador 
to Ukraine Jan Tombinski that the composition of the 
commission responsible for selecting an anti-corruption 
prosecutor was changed to respond to civil society’s de-
mands. Under similar external pressure, a number of laws 
demanded by the EU to make Ukraine eligible for visa-
free travel were passed, albeit some shortcomings still 
have to be removed. Thus, the key factors are stronger 
conditionality, which links domestic reforms to benefits 
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from the EU (and other international institutions); public 
communication of positions on reforms; and joining 
forces with reformers inside the country. 
On a more practical level, Germany and the EU should 
support the establishment of new structures. Careful 
observation suggests that reforms have succeeded in two 
types of context: a) when new parallel structures were 
established with the hope that they would overtake the 
old ones in the long run, and b) when new structures 
emerged where nothing existed before. Reorganizing the 
old structures has proved rather ineffective. Examples of 
newly created structures include the new police, the Anti-
Corruption Bureau, and the online public procurement 
system. 
While maintaining a focus at the decision-making level, 
it is also important to redouble efforts to implement and 
enforce new laws. Benchmarks and conditionality have 
to become more precise at this level. Moreover, reform 
of the civil service and the judiciary are of the outmost 
importance for enforcement and sustainability of efforts 
to transform the system. They therefore require special 
attention.
The success of Ukraine’s transformation will depend 
greatly on the ability of actors at the local level to use the 
opportunities offered by decentralization and numerous 
transparency initiatives. Civil society’s capacity at the 
local level to take the initiative and hold the authorities 
accountable is still limited, however. International donors 
need to pay special attention to this.
Finally, reforms and Ukraine’s long-term developments 
should not be held hostage to the Minsk Process. 1) It is 
desirable to detach decentralization reform from the 
Minsk Process. The country’s constitution is not the ap-
propriate document for reflecting on the temporary occu-
pation of a part of Ukraine. In any case, it is unlikely that 
the amendments on decentralization will be passed in 
the second reading (300 votes will not be secured), which 
will stall decentralization reform. 2) Free and fair local 
elections cannot take place until all conditions stipulated 
by international norms and Ukrainian legislation are 
secured. Some sort of control over the Ukrainian-Russian 
border (perhaps by international observers) and the pres-
ence of international observers in the occupied territories 
are necessary prerequisites for this. Elections cannot take 
place before these conditions are met (and this is where 
cooperation on Russia’s part is needed).
Ukraine’s political leaders need to be more aware of the 
historic opportunity their country received after Euro-
maidan and their responsibility to make use of it. The past 
two years – and especially the most recent government 
and coalition crisis – showed that the sense of responsi-
bility is weaker than short-term interests. This has to be 
changed.
Important foundations for genuine transformation 
have already been laid, but they are not yet sufficient to 
make a breakthrough toward the “new Ukraine.” More-
over, society is losing patience and wants to see results. 
Several success stories in fighting corruption – namely 
bringing to justice individuals from the current high 
political establishment and former Yanukovych associates 
who feature in media investigations – would be an impor-
tant sign of political will.
Acceleration of civil service and judiciary reforms are 
other important priorities for the reasons detailed above. 
Success in both areas will guarantee efficient implemen-
tation of reforms in general and ensure that the new rules 
of the game will be respected. 
Finally, initiatives that ensure a more competitive 
and equal-opportunity environment in terms of access 
to public resources have to be accelerated. These include 
liberal taxation reform, reform of public enterprises 
(including through privatization), and more deregulation 
efforts. Such reforms will eliminate many of the channels 
through which vested interests pursue “state capture,” 
while making it possible for smaller economic actors to 
unlock their potential. 
Implementing the measures outlined above requires 
strong and visionary political leadership. This, together 
with pressure from below and from external actors, will 
make a real difference. 
Iryna Solonenko is an associate fellow at the DGAP’s 
Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Central Asia and a researcher at the European 
University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder.
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